Juan Valdez, Appellant v. Department of Justice, Appellee.

No. 07-5131.United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Filed On: December 31, 2007.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

BEFORE: Rogers, Garland, and Griffith, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam.

ORDER
Upon consideration of the trust account report and the consent to collection of fees, it is.

ORDERED that pursuant to appellant’s consent to collection of fees, appellant’s custodian is directed to pay on appellant’s behalf the initial partial filing fee of $18.33, to be withheld from appellant’s trust fund account. See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The payment must be by check or money order made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Appellant’s custodian also is directed to collect and pay from appellant’s trust account monthly installments of 20 per cent of the previous month’s income credited to appellant’s account, until the full $455 docketing fee has been paid. See28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Such payments must be made each month the amount in the account exceeds $10 and must be designated as made in payment of the filing fee for Case No. 07-5131, an appeal from Civil Action No. 04-950. A copy of this order must accompany each remittance. In the event appellant is transferred to another institution, the balance due must be collected and paid to the Clerk by the custodian at appellant’s next institution. Appellant’s custodian must notify the Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in the event appellant is released from custody.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to appellant, by whatever means necessary to ensure receipt, and to the Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Clerk is further directed to send to appellant’s custodian a copy of this order and appellant’s consent to collection of fees.

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Upon consideration of the motion for appointment of counsel, the motion for summary affirmance and the opposition thereto, and the court’s order to show cause filed September 10, 2007, which was re-sent on October 18, 2007, and the response thereto, it is.

ORDERED that the order to show cause be discharged. It is.

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied. With the exception of defendants appealing or defending in criminal cases, appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is.

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See TaxpayersWatchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Based on the declaration submitted by the Drug Enforcement Agency on remand, the district court properly determined the agency had adequately justified its refusal to confirm or deny the existence of records because that information would be protected under Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Any responsive records, if they existed, would be law enforcement records pertaining to a third party. To balance against the privacy interests protected by Exemption 7(C), appellant has failed to “produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred” — which is the standard set by the Supreme Court for evaluating Exemption 7(C) claims. NationalArchives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174
(2004). Appellant’s

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unsubstantiated assertions of government wrongdoing do not establish a meaningful evidentiary showing that can overcome the presumption of legitimacy accorded to the government’s official conduct. See Boyd v. DOJ, 475 F.3d 381, 388-89 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Favish, 541 U.S. at 174-75. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the government.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc.See Fed.R.App.P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

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