NOVAK v. WORLD BANK, 703 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

GEORGE J. NOVAK, APPELLANT v. WORLD BANK, ET AL.

No. 82-1316.United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.Argued November 18, 1982.
Decided April 1, 1983.

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George J. Novak, pro se.

David P. Durbin, with whom Lawrence E. Carr, Jr., Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.Civil Action No. 81-01329).

Before MacKINNON and SCALIA, Circuit Judges, and SWYGERT,[*]
Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:

[1] Appellant, George J. Novak, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his action against his former employer, the World Bank,[1] and his local bank, Madison National Bank (Madison National), alleging age discrimination, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976),[2] and conspiracy to deter, by intimidation and harassment, his prosecution of actions against World Bank in the United States courts, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Supp. IV 1980).[3] The district court summarily dismissed appellant’s complaint against Madison National on the grounds of res judicata. The complaint against World Bank was dismissed for failure

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to perfect service. Novak v. World Bank, No. 81-1329 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982). We reverse because res judicata does not apply to the complaint against Madison National and because there is a reasonable prospect that service can be made on World Bank.

I.
[2] Appellant, age 53 when he filed his complaint in 1981, was an employee of World Bank from April 1967 until his dismissal in October 1979. His complaint in this action alleges a litany of misdeeds allegedly perpetrated against him by World Bank in pursuit of a policy of age discrimination. Complaint ¶¶ 20-27.[4] Appellant claims that World Bank harassed, threatened, and intimidated him as he attempted to pursue his employment discrimination claims. Complaint ¶¶ 34-42, 45.[5] He also asserts that Madison National participated in a conspiracy with World Bank and others to implicate him in a check forging scheme and thereby force his resignation, and to harass and intimidate him. Complaint ¶¶ 15, 28-33, 46.[6]

[3] This action is appellant’s third attempt to assert his claims against World Bank in federal court. In February 1979, appellant commenced an action in the district court alleging that World Bank had impermissibly discriminated against him on the basis of age and nationality, and had harassed him during the administrative review process, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Complaint ¶ 26, Novak v. World Bank, No. 79-0641 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 26, 1979). Appellant’s complaint sought, inter alia, to enjoin World Bank “and those acting openly or covertly in concert with them,

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from threatening or engaging in any acts of reprisal, retribution, punishment or harassment against plaintiff because of his attempts to vindicate his right to equal employment opportunity.” Id., Part V, ¶ 7. This action did not include Madison National, nor did it aver the facts alleged in the present action with respect to that entity. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Novak v. World Bank, No. 79-0641, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. June 12, 1979).[7] No appeal was taken.

[4] Undeterred, appellant filed a second action alleging essentially the same facts as his first, but grounding recovery against World Bank on “negligent business practices and personal injury.” Complaint ¶ 20, Novak v. World Bank, No. 79-2305 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 1979). Once again, Madison National was not a party to, nor mentioned in, appellant’s action. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata. Novak v. World Bank, No. 79-2305 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 1979), aff’d without opinion, No. 79-2382 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 1980).

[5] Madison National filed a motion to dismiss appellant’s most recent action, claiming that principles of res judicata barred his action because of his previous, unsuccessful litigation with World Bank. The district court granted Madison National’s motion, summarily dismissing with prejudice appellant’s action against Madison National “according to the principles of res judicata . . . .” Novak v. World Bank, No. 81-1329 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982). World Bank did not enter an appearance in the district court because appellant’s attempts to effect service on World Bank had been frustrated.[8] The district court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice appellant’s action against World Bank “for failure to obtain proper service.” Id. This appeal followed.

II.[6] A. Madison National Bank
[7] Madison National contends that appellant’s action against it is barred by principles of res judicata. It asserts that all of the events supporting appellant’s conspiracy action against Madison National occurred prior to his earlier litigation against World Bank. Madison National argues that appellant could have brought his conspiracy claim against Madison National in those earlier actions and, so, is barred by res judicata from doing so now in a suit involving Madison National. We cannot agree. The doctrine of res judicata based on prior adjudications in cases brought against World Bank has no application to appellant’s action against Madison National, and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is relevant to that action, does not bar appellant’s action against that organization.[9]

[8] The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are easily confused because the

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term “res judicata” is often used to embrace both doctrines. 1B J. Moore T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.405[1], at 621-23 (2d ed. 1982). However, it is important to distinguish the two concepts because res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in different circumstances with different consequences to litigants. The Supreme Court recently articulated the distinction:

Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.

[9] Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (citations omitted).[10]

[10] Thus, res judicata prevents the relitigation of any claim
that was or that might have been brought in a prior action resolved on its merits, while collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of any issue that was raised and decided in a prior action. Id. Furthermore, res judicata applies only between parties and their privies to the prior action, while collateral estoppel may be invoked by a stranger to the prior action against a party to that action. Although in the past the doctrine of mutuality applied to both res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court in recent decisions has virtually eliminated the mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28, 331, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649-650, 651, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (mutuality not required for “offensive” collateral estoppel); Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-27, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1438-1442, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (mutuality not required for “defensive” collateral estoppel). However, mutuality still applies to res judicata — only parties and their privies to the prior action (whose rights against one another with regard to the binding effect of the judgment are of course reciprocal) are bound by the doctrine. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, supra, 439 U.S. at 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 649 n. 5.

[11] Application of these principles to this case reveals that the district court erred in dismissing appellant’s complaint against Madison National on the grounds of res judicata. Madison National was not a party to appellant’s earlier actions,[11] and, therefore, res judicata cannot bar appellant’s action against Madison National.[12]

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Although it is possible that Madison National could successfully invoke collateral estoppel to prevent appellant from relitigating issues actually decided in his prior actions against World Bank, the question of whether appellant has a cognizable claim under section 1985(2) was not raised in his earlier actions. In his first action appellant claimed that World Bank’s harassment and intimidation violated the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed that claim because the Fifth Amendment did not apply to World Bank’s activities since it was not a branch of the federal government. Novak v. World Bank, No. 79-0641, supra,
slip op. at 3. The district court did not determine whether the alleged harassment and intimidation by World Bank stated a claim under section 1985(2). That being the case, appellant’s section 1985 action against Madison National is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s action against Madison National.[13]

[12] B. World Bank
[13] The district court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice appellant’s action against World Bank for failure to effect service on that organization. Although district courts have broad discretion to dismiss a complaint for failure to effect service, dismissal is not appropriate when there exists a reasonable prospect that service can be obtained. Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1071 (2d Cir. 1971); Richardson v. Ingram Corp., 374 F.2d 502, 503 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866, 88 S.Ct. 134, 19 L.Ed.2d 139 (1967). We reverse the dismissal of appellant’s action against World Bank because there is a reasonable prospect that service can be obtained on World Bank.

[14] We are greatly concerned by the United States Marshal’s refusal to serve World Bank in this case. The Marshal failed to serve process on World Bank because it refused to accept service,[14]
claiming immunity from suit. See note 8 supra. It is not proper for a United States “Marshal to avoid his duty to serve process merely because he notices the availability of a defense to the suit . . . .” Hellenic Lines v. Moore,
120 U.S.App.D.C. 288, 289, 345 F.2d 978, 979 (1965) (footnote omitted). If the Marshal refuses to serve persons who assert defenses to process, such persons could create their own immunity from suit simply by declining to accept service. The Marshal should carry out his responsibilities to serve process without regard to potential defenses, leaving decisions as to the validity of such defenses to the courts.

[15] The Marshal should have left the summons with the specified World Bank officials and World Bank, if it claimed service was improper, should have contested the validity of service and asserted that it was not amenable to suit in the district court, as, indeed, it asserted in appellant’s prior actions.[15]
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s claim against World Bank. We would ordinarily also direct the district court to order the Marshal to serve World Bank but a recent change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure removed the Marshals from such duty. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-462. Marshals now are without authorization to serve summonses and complaints in actions

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brought by individual citizens; such process is now to be served by persons who are not parties and are not less than 18 years of age. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c).

III.
[16] The district court’s reliance on principles of res judicata to dismiss appellant’s action against Madison National was erroneous and such dismissal is vacated. The district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of appellant’s action against World Bank is also vacated and plaintiff may proceed to effect service of process in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. In reaching this result we wish to emphasize that we express no opinion on the merits of appellant’s various claims against World Bank and Madison National.

[17] Judgment accordingly.