No. 87-5337.United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.Argued October 13, 1988.
Decided May 19, 1989.
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Susan Au Allen, for appellant. Paul Shearman Allen, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Bradley L. Kelly, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John B. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 86-00201).
Before EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and REYNOLDS,[*]
Senior District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior District Judge REYNOLDS.
REYNOLDS, Senior District Judge:
[1] Masonry Masters, Inc., and Rigoberto Perdomo appeal from a decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia granting the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (“INS”) motion for summary judgment and approving the INS’s denial of Masonry Masters’ petition for a sixth-preference immigration visa. Masonry Masters challenges the INS’s authority to require an employer, who is applying for a sixth-preference visa on behalf of an alien employee, to demonstrate the employer’s ability to pay the offered wage at the time the employer first submits an application for certification to the Department of Labor (“DOL”). The INS first imposed this requirement in Matter of Great Wall, 16 I N Dec. 142 (A.R.C. 1977). Pursuant to this requirement, the INS asked Masonry Masters to prove that it could have paid the offered wage in 1979, the year Masonry Masters first submitted a certification application to the DOL, even though the DOL did not issue the certification until 1982, and the INS did not consider Masonry Masters’ visa petition until 1984. [2] We find that although the INS has the authority to investigate Masonry Masters’ ability to pay at the time MasonryPage 900
Masters applied for labor certification, it is an abuse of the INS’s discretion to insist on evidence of Masonry Masters’ ability to pay anything more than the prevailing wage at the time of the application for labor certification. We, therefore, reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
[3] I. FACTS
[4] Appellant Masonry Masters is a construction contractor in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Masonry Masters is a successor in interest to Tenco Masonry, Inc. (“Tenco”), which is no longer in business. Appellant Rigoberto Perdomo (“Perdomo”) is an El Salvadoran national who has worked for Masonry Masters and its predecessor Tenco as a bricklayer since 1978.
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Masters’ motion for reconsideration. In its motion for reconsideration, Masonry Masters submitted, among other things, an affidavit from Masonry Masters’ controller Virgilio Longo which stated that Masonry Masters had the ability to pay Perdomo $10 per hour in 1979, and copies of Perdomo’s Federal Tax Forms W-2 for the years 1979 through 1983.
[8] Masonry Masters then brought an action for a declaratory judgment in district court claiming that the INS had acted arbitrarily and contrary to law. The district court rejected Masonry Masters’ claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the INS, 664 F.Supp. 9 (1987). Masonry Masters has appealed the district court’s decision on several grounds; however, the dispositive issue on this appeal concerns the scope of the INS’s authority to investigate an employer’s ability to pay an alien at the time the employer applies for DOL certification.[9] II. ANALYSIS
[10] Masonry Masters applied for a sixth-preference visa for Perdomo. Sixth-preference visas are available to aliens capable of performing skilled or unskilled labor of a permanent nature “for which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1982). In seeking a sixth-preference visa, an employer is required to file a petition with the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1982). The Attorney General has delegated all powers relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, including the issuance of sixth-preference visas, to the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1988).
(N.D.Ill. 1982), aff’d mem., 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). [14] In short, an applicant for a sixth-preference visa must convince the DOL that the offered wage is equal to or greater than the prevailing wage, and convince the INS that the job offer is realistic. Taken together, the applicant may be required to prove an ability to pay the prevailing wage. [15] In 1977, the INS first decided to test the realism of a job offer by investigating the employer’s ability to pay the worker the offered wage as of the date of the application for DOL certification. The INS explained
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in Matter of Great Wall, 16 I N Dec. 142 (A.R.C. 1977):
[16] Id. at 145 (emphasis in original). [17] This explanation expresses the INS’s concern that, since the filing of an application for DOL certification establishes visa issuance priority, it would be unfair to allow an employer to get into the line for processing at a time when it is unable to meet the INS requirements.[4] The INS’s decision in Great Wall may also express a concern that allowing employers to file for labor certification at a time when they are unable to pay the offered wage would increase the incidence of unrealistic applications and thereby waste the INS’s time. Although the data concerning an employer’s ability to pay at the time of applying for DOL certification may well be obsolete by the time the INS issues the visa petition, the INS’s reasons for demanding such data are rational. [18] The entanglement of the INS’s requirements with those of the DOL, however, seem to place an irrational burden on Masonry Masters, and perhaps it commonly creates such a burden. Masonry Masters’ offered wage (item 29 on the DOL’s form, “Application for Alien Employment Certification — Job Offer for Alien Employment”) must meet the DOL’s view of the prevailing wage.In sixth-preference visa petition proceedings, the Service must consider the merits of the petitioner’s job offer, so that a determination can be made whether the job offer is realistic and whether the wage offer can be met as well as determine whether the alien meets the minimum requirements to perform the offered job satisfactorily. It follows that such consideration by the Service would necessarily be focused on the circumstances at the time of filing
of the petition. The petitioner in the instant case cannot expect to establish a priority date for visa issuance for the beneficiary when at the time of making the job offer and the filing of the petition with this Service he could not, in all reality, pay the salary as stated in the job offer.
It appears that the DOL determines the prevailing wage at the time it reviews the application and issues the certification. Certainly 20 C.F.R. § 656.20(c)(2), quoted above, in no respect suggests a backward-looking determination. Moreover, the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14), which call for a finding that the employment “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed,” invite a consideration of the future. Therefore, in specifying its offered wage, an employer must at least keep one eye on the time when the DOL is likely to get around to passing upon the labor certification application. In this case, that moment arrived three years after Masonry Masters filed its application. [19] Under these circumstances, it is hard to make sense of the INS’s insistence that Masonry Masters demonstrate an ability to pay Perdomo $10 an hour — the offer specified in Masonry Masters’ application for DOL certification — in 1979. As one may infer from the DOL’s certification that the prevailing wage was at or below $10 an hour in 1982, it is most improbable that $10 an hour was a realistic or prevailing wage in 1979. On such a record, it is an abuse of the INS’s discretion to insist on evidence of Masonry Masters’ ability to pay Perdomo $10 an hour in 1979. On remand, the INS’s inquiry into Masonry Masters’ ability to pay in 1979 should be limited to an ability to pay some figure reasonably determined to have been the prevailing wage in 1979.
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[20] The court also wishes to express concern over the INS’s view as to suitable evidence to demonstrate ability to pay. In rejecting Masonry Master’s visa petition for Perdomo on June 19, 1985, the INS wrote:[21] INS Decision at 2. [22] The INS’s approach is puzzling. The balance sheet is only a snapshot of the employer’s assets at a given moment and, thus, speaks only obliquely to the employer’s ability to generate cash for payment of wages at some later date. The INS’s interest in the income statement appears to assume that the worker will contribute nothing to income. This seems wholly unrealistic; one would expect an employer to hire only workers whose marginal contribution to the value of the company’s production equals or exceeds their wages. Assuming that the INS has some theory as to how to assess an employer’s ability to pay a wage, it would be helpful if it revealed what it was. [23] In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.When this Service requested evidence of your ability to pay, you were advised that the evidence could be in the form of [1] balance sheets or [2] a financial statement indicating that your gross income less expenses leaves a net profit sufficient to pay the proffered wage.
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor [shall be ineligible to receive visas], unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified . . . and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
(2) Filing date. In the case of a third or sixth preference petition (except for an occupation listed in Schedule A), the filing date of the petition within the meaning of section 203(c) of the Act will be the date the request for certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment service system of the Department of Labor.