No. 75-1510.United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.Argued March 31, 1976.
Decided April 23, 1976. Rehearing Denied May 17, 1976.
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Edward G. Villalon, Washington, D.C., with whom James E. Wilson and Jon F. Hollengreen, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for petitioner and intervenor Steel Carriers Conference of A. T. A. Chandler L. van Orman, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for intervenor, Pre-Fab Transit Co.
Peter A. Fitzpatrick, Atty., I. C. C., Washington, D.C., with whom Fritz R. Kahn, Gen. Counsel, I. C. C. and John H. D. Wigger, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for respondents.
Paul M. Daniell, Washington, D.C., of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, pro hac vice by special leave of court, with whom Edward G. Villalon, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for intervenors, Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., and others.
John P. McMahon and A. Charles Tell, Columbus, Ohio, were on the brief for intervenors, Ace Doran Hauling Rigging Co., and others.
E. Stephen Heisley, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for intervenor, Colonial Refrigerated Transportation, Inc.
Edward G. Villalon, Washington, D.C., signed a brief for intervenors Anderson Trucking Service, Inc., and others.
Petition for Review of an Order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge and A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSEN,[*] United States Senior District Judge for the District of Utah.
PER CURIAM:
[1] The issues in this case are well known to the industry, and are reasonably identified in the opinions (including the dissenting opinion) of the Interstate Commerce Commission on reconsideration. We therefore propose no extended statement of the facts and issue. At issue are the Commission’s Gateway Elimination Regulations challenged as being in excess of the Commission’s statutory authority and as being promulgated without adequate notice. These regulations govern the “gateway” problems experienced by irregular-route motor common carriers, and seek to eliminate circuitous operations resulting from the carriers combining or “tacking” two separate grants of route authority at a service point common to each.[1] In Thompson Van Lines v. United States,[2] a three-judge district court held that the elimination of gateways by rulemaking was an appropriate exercise of the ICC’s rulemaking authority. This case challenges the appropriateness of applying the Gateway Elimination Rules to transfers and acquisitions of irregular route certificates. The Commission specifically addressed and rejected petitioners’ argument.[3] I.
[2] In brief, we affirm the regulations and order, and deny the petitions for review for the following reasons.
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explained in the general notice.[4] Even where there is a technical flaw in the notice, it can be overcome if the actual conduct of the proceeding provides notice to the participants of what is under contemplation. See, e.g., Texaco v. F.E.A.,
531 F.2d 1071 (1976). Here, the reference in the docket which accompanied the formal notice of rulemaking would indicate, albeit in a footnote, that in the Commission’s mind a corollary of its proposed new gateway approach would be its application to future transfers of operating rights and certificates. That footnote did prompt presentations on behalf of some irregular carriers making the kind of points raised by petitioners before us. These points were presented to the I.C.C. prior to issuance of the gateway regulations. The same points were of course raised after issuance of the gateway regulations on petitions for reconsideration. That the attention of the Commission was focused on the matter is clear enough from the analysis in Commissioner Clapp’s dissent as well as from the discussion in the Commission’s opinion.
II.
[5] On the legal issues in the case, while the discussion of the ICC is compressed, we think it is adequate, especially when taken in combination with the discussion of the court in Thompson, supra.
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hope that at this relatively late moment of time, a large part of the paperwork burdens that resulted from the order may belong more to the past than the future. In any event, the reviewing court must restrain itself from intervention in the absence of a convincing showing of unreasonableness.
[8] We have considered and rejected other arguments made by petitioners. [9] Affirmed.