No. 76-2000.United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.Argued December 17, 1976.
Decided December 30, 1976. Order November 9, 1976. Order filed November 18, 1976.
76-2053; Phillips Petroleum Co., 76-2069; Public Service Commission of New York, 76-2072; and Marathon Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 76-2103.
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Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Washington, D.C., with whom William T. Miller and Stanley W. Balis, Washington, D.C., were on the memoranda for petitioners American Public Gas Assn., Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, United Steelworkers of America, Intern. Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO and for Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN).
Daniel J. Guttman, White Plains, N.Y., was on the memoranda for petitioners James Abourezk, et al.
James L. Feldesman, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for petitioner Consumer Federation of America.
Carla Vivian Bello, Newark, N.J., was on the memoranda for petitioner New Jersey Bd. of Public Utility Com’rs.
Warren Spannaus, St. Paul, Minn., was on the memoranda for petitioner, State of Minn.
Rodney A. Wilson, St. Paul, Minn., was on the memoranda for petitioner, Minn. Public Service Commission.
Steven M. Schur, Madison, Wis., was on the memoranda for petitioner, Public Service Commission of Wis.
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Stephen I. Schlossberg, Detroit, Mich., was on the memoranda for petitioner United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
David B. Graham, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for petitioner Nat. Rural Electric Cooperative Assn.
Frank W. Frisk, Jr., Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for petitioner American Public Power Assn.
John E. Gunther, San Francisco, Cal., was on the memoranda for petitioner U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Charles F. Brannan, Denver, Colo., was on the memoranda for petitioner National Farmers Union.
Lee D. Sinclair, Potomac, Md., was on the memoranda for petitioner Nat. Farmers Organization.
James F. Flug, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for petitioner Energy Action Committee.
James L. Magavern, Buffalo, N.Y., was on the memoranda for petitioner County of Erie, N.Y.
Leslie G. Foschio, Buffalo, N.Y., was on the memoranda for petitioner City of Buffalo, N.Y.
Drexel D. Journey, General Counsel, Federal Power Commission, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Peter H. Schiff, Gen. Counsel, New York City, and Richard A. Solomon and Sheila S. Hollis, Washington, D.C., were on the memoranda for Public Service Commission of the State of N.Y.
Gordon P. MacDougall, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
Gordon Gooch, Washington, D.C., with whom Thomas G. Johnson, Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Tenneco Oil Co; Pennzoil Co., Pennzoil Producing Co.; Pennzoil Offshore Gas Operators, Inc.; Pennzoil La. and Texas Offshore, Inc.; The Rodman Corp.; and Texasgulf, Inc. and Felmont Oil Corp.
David G. Stevenson, Tulsa, Okl., was on the memoranda for Amerada Hess Corp.
David M. Whitney, Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Aminol USA, Inc., et al.
William H. Emerson, Tulsa, Okl., was on the memoranda for Amoco Production Co.
R. F. Generally, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Ashland Oil Inc. and General American Oil Co. of Tex.
E. J. Kremer, Jr., and D. Aston, Dallas, Tex., was on the memoranda for Atlantic Richfield Co.
Edwin S. Nail, Boston, Mass., was on the memoranda for Cabot Corp.
Justin R. Wolf, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for The Cal. Co., et al. and Chevron Oil Co., Western Div.
Sam Riggs, Jr., Liberal, Kan., was on the memoranda for Cities Service Oil Co.
W. Neal Powers, Jr., Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Estate of E. Cockrell, Jr.
Tom Burton and John M. Badger, Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Continental Oil Co.
T. Brooke Farnsworth and William Neal Powers, Jr., Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Damson Oil Corp.
W. E. Notestine, Amarillo, Tex., was on the memoranda for Diamond Shamrock Corp.
Scott Anger, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Enserch Inc.
Martin N. Erck, Paul W. Wright and Edmunds Travis, Jr., Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Exxon Corp.
Wm. Neal Powers, Jr., Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Freeport Minerals Co.
Cloy D. Monzingo, Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Getty Oil Co.
B. James McGraw was on the memoranda for Gulf Oil Corp.
H. Lamar Curtis, Jr., Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for J. M. Huber Corp.
Robert W. Henderson, Dallas, Tex., was on the memoranda for Hunt Oil Co., Inc.
Arthur S. Berner, New York City, was on the memoranda for Inexco Oil Co.
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Derrill Cody and Patricia D. Robinson, Oklahoma City, Okl., were on the memoranda for Kerr-McGee Corp.
William A. Sackmann, Findlay, Ohio was on the memoranda for Marathon Oil Co.
Tom P. Hamill, R. D. Haworth and Roscoe C. Elmore, Jr., Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Mobil Oil Corp.
John L. Williford, Bartlesville, Okl., was on the memoranda for Phillips Petroleum Co.
Paul W. Hicks and Jimmy C. Bailey, Dallas, Tex., were on the memoranda for Placid Oil Co.
Ronald E. Jarrett and Ronald J. Jacobs, Tulsa, Okl., were on the memoranda for Skelly Oil Co.
Richard F. Remmers, Oklahoma City, Okl., was on the memoranda for Sohio Petroleum Co.
William S. Jameson, Dallas, Tex., was on the memoranda for Southern Union Production Co.
James D. Olsen, Richardson, Tex., was on the memoranda for Sun Oil Co.
Roger L. Brandt, Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Texaco, Inc.
Michael B. Silva and Phyllis Rainey, Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Tenneco Oil Co.
George W. Hugo, Houston, Tex., was on the memoranda for Texasgulf, Inc.
Kenneth L. Riedman, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal., and Richard F. Wornson, Valencia, Cal., were on the memoranda for Union Oil Co. and Union Oil Company of Cal.
Alexander E. Bennett, David Bonderman, Washington, D.C., Willard B. Wagner, Jr., and Pat F. Timmons, Houston, Tex., were on the memoranda for Superior Oil Co.
Tilford A. Jones, Bethesda, Md., and C. William Cooper, Falmouth, Mass., were on the memoranda for United Distribution Companies.
Harold B. Scoggins, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Independent Petroleum Ass’n of America.
Jerome McGrath, Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n.
Paul E. Goldstein and Paul W. Mallory, Chicago, III., were on the memoranda for Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America.
Eugene W. Ward and T. E. Midyett, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., were on the memoranda for Tenn. Public Service Commission.
Jeffrey A. Meith, Oroville, Cal., was on the memoranda for Southern Cal. Gas Co.
James L. Bomar, Jr., Shelbyville, Tenn., was on the memoranda for East Tennessee Group.
Frank P. Saponaro, Jr., Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Statex Petroleum Inc.
J. David Mann, Jr., Washington, D.C., was on the memoranda for Laclede Gas Co.
Peter W. Hanschen, Los Angeles, Cal., was on the memoranda for Pac. Gas Elec. Co.
Petition for review from the Federal Power Commission.
Before: FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge; LEVENTHAL and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
PER CURIAM:
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remains in effect. Calendaring of oral argument on the merits will be expedited to the fullest extent possible.
PER CURIAM:
[5] Following denial by the Federal Power Commission of rehearing of Opinion No. 770 by Opinion No. 770-A on November 5, 1976, petitions for review were filed in this court and, as well, in the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The Commission has advised that the first timely filings of such petitions occurred simultaneously in this circuit and the Fifth Circuit. The question arises as to the circuit in which litigation of Opinions Nos. 770 and 770-A should proceed. We conclude that it should go forward here. I
[6] Judicial review of a Commission order under the Natural Gas Act is appropriately instituted by a petition to this court, or to the court of appeals for any other circuit wherein a natural gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). That section further ordains that “[u]pon the filing of such petitions such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the [administrative] record with it shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part.” These provisions are complemented by three additional specifications:
[7] 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1970). See also S.Rep. No. 2129, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News, 1958, p. 3996. [8] In the cases at bar, however, there is no court of appeals in which a first-filling of a petition to review occurred. As the Commission states, petitions were filed in the Fifth Circuit and here at exactly the same moment, and we are unimpressed by opposing arguments that nonetheless one or the other filing should be deemed prior in time. Some petitioners in this circuit have drawn attention to claimed defects in the earliest Fifth Circuit filing[1] but, in our view, they are not determinative because they are not jurisdictional in nature. Nor are we persuaded that priority was conferred by proceedings in this circuit seeking emergency relief immediately after the Commission issued Opinion No. 770. Under the Natural Gas Act, an order lacks jurisdictional ripeness for review until the Commission has disposed of a petition to reconsider alleged error in it (or until a reasonable time to act upon such petition has expired). See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) (1970). To hold that a motion under the All Writs Act for extraordinary relief from an order — when a petition for review of that order would be premature — constitutes a “proceeding with respect to such order” within the meaning of Section 2112(a) might accelerate races to the courthouse in efforts toIf proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to the same order the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts in which such proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court of appeals in which the record has been filed. For the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice such court may thereafter transfer all the proceedings with respect to such order to any other court of appeals.
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secure the forum for the merits. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 338 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1964). We think the better reconstruction of congressional intent is that requests for interim relief are not to be included in the calculus of first-filing set forth in Section 2112(a).
[9] In view of the lack of first-filing in any one circuit, Section 2112(a) cannot be implemented through the mechanics set forth in its first sentence quoted above. Instead, we look to the ultimate provision of § 2112(a), which authorizes transfer of the proceedings to another circuit “[f]or the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice.” Judicial review in the forum determined by that standard is a stated congressional goal, and our obligation is to honor the legislative will as expressed in the statute as a whole. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,122 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 378, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (1965). [10] We think resort to the foregoing approach is appropriate to dissolve the procedural impasse arising here. It gives effect to the overall congressional intent. Compare International Union of Electrical R. M. Workers v. NLRB, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 46-47, 343 F.2d 327, 328-329 (1965). There is no impediment to such an undertaking on our part, for the Fifth Circuit has agreed to a procedure whereby this court “should take the lead and reach a determination on venue.” See our order of December 13, 1976, appended hereto. Cf. Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
155 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 476 F.2d 907 (1973); see also NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, 514 F.2d 475, 476 (1st Cir. 1975).
II
[11] Turning to the standard of the last sentence of Section 2112(a), it is our conclusion that the convenience of the parties is furthered by retention of these cases in the District of Columbia Circuit, and that there are no offsetting considerations in the interest of justice to warrant transfer of the litigation to any other circuit.
(1976), on rehearing, 525 F.2d 1261 (1976) — which reviewed Opinion No. 699-H, the first Commission order setting natural gas rates on a nationwide basis — has gained such familiarity with the background of the present controversy as to command preference for its resolution. But general familiarity with the legal questions presented by a case is decidedly different from acquaintance with the proceedings that gave rise to the order in suit. Certainly, “where the same or inter-related proceeding was previously under review in a court of appeals, and is now brought for review of an order entered after remand, or in a follow-up phase,” the desirability of “continuity in the total proceeding” calls strongly for handling by the same reviewing tribunal Public Service Comm’n v. FPC, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 197, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (1972). Cf. American Tel. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322, 325-327 (2d Cir. 1975). That is not to say, as the producers do, that prior consideration by one court of particular legal issues should preclude other courts from entertaining distinct though somewhat similar issues.[2] Implicit in the
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argument is a concept of specialized circuits and panels for certain types of cases, a suggestion we have previously rejected.[3]
[14] In our view, then, the Fifth Circuit’s exposure to earlier versions of nationwide gas ratemaking does not weigh materially in the balance.[4] Nor do we perceive any other factor that would override retention of the litigation in this circuit for the convenience of the parties.[5] We thus conclude that jurisdictionPage 859
and venue are proper here. The Commission will accordingly be directed to file the record in this court, and the parties will continue to be bound by the briefing schedule established by our order of December 6, 1976. The Clerk is instructed to expedite oral argument, and to schedule the case, in accordance with the procedures established by the Judicial Council,[6] before a panel sitting between March 17 and April 6, 1977 — the sitting period next following completion of briefing.
[15] It is ordered. [16] Senior Circuit Judge FAHY concurs in the foregoing and adds only that it will be noted that even were the petition under the All Writs Act which led to our Order of August 9, 1976, a proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) as it might affect the question of priority of filing, our ultimate decision on retaining venue would be supported by the other considerations we set forth, considered alone.153 U.S.App.D.C. at 197 n. 4, 472 F.2d at 1272 n. 4:
[a]s to Eastern’s use of “same or interrelated” proceeding, the “interrelated” term refers to an organic relation, in what may fairly be called a single “total proceeding” and not merely similarity of legal issues.
Both the Fifth and the District of Columbia Circuits have engaged extensively in review of the Commission’s gas rate-making proceedings, and it may be safely assumed that whichever reviews the orders in suit will take the Fifth Circuit’s Shell decision into account.
153 U.S.App.D.C. at 197-198, 472 F.2d at 1272-73:
This motion . . . implicitly invokes a theory of specialization of tribunals. That is not what Congress has provided. The contention based upon specialization of particular judges is even more debatable. The Judicial Council for this circuit, at least, has adopted a system of selection of judges by lot that eschews any concept of specialized appellate judges, and contemplates broadening of judicial exposure in meeting common problems. It provides for retention of the same panel that handled an earlier appeal in the same case, . . . but not for reference to a panel that handled a different case on the basis of similarity of underlying questions.
The approach of the District of Columbia Circuit is not different in principle from that of the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedures Manual, § V-A-2, reveals its panel selection procedure as one based upon a mathematical matrix, with the names of judges for each panel drawn by lot by the circuit executive, and with the identity of each panel unknown to the clerk when he makes calendar assignments. We are also aware of an exception to the Fifth Circuit’s general procedures, set forth in § VI-C-3:
Gas Cases — To avoid disqualification in the selection of panels on a routine basis, panels to handle cases involving regulation of natural gas companies by the Federal Power Commission are drawn by lot on a yearly basis from the active judges of the Court. All administrative motions filed in pending gas cases during that panel’s period of service and any gas cases that may be readied on the merits prior to the expiration of that panel’s period of service are referred to the panel originally drawn.
This exception, as the foregoing shows, is not based on experience and a desire to achieve specialization, but to avoid occasions for recusal.
(1972); International Union of Electrical R. M. Workers v. NLRB, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 47, 343 F.2d 327, 329 (1965); Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973). We cannot identify a circuit in which the impact of Opinions Nos. 770 and 770-A, which set natural gas rates nationwide, will be so differently felt that review in that circuit should be preferred. Additional factors are “facilitation of judicial economy,”Abourezk v. FPC, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 247 n. 1, 513 F.2d 504, 505 n. 1 (1975), and the interest of the parties and the public at large in the most expeditious resolution of the litigation consistent with sound decision-making. Recognition of the high cost of delay prompted our order of December 6, 1976, expediting briefing on the merits, which has been commended by all concerned. Yet, since we must assume that any other circuit would be equally alert, the desirability of a prompt decision in no way indicates which circuit should make it.
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